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Abstract
The Scottish historical novelist, John Galt assumed that the origins of law rested on the
anarchistic and primitive nature of human beings, who formed a society on a contractual basis
out of the need for security. Although generally agreeing with enlightenment thinkers on the
formation of society, law and human nature a divergence in Galt’s thought appeared in the
secular treatment of crimes. Adhering to prevalent Christian notions about sin and crime, Galt
rejected a clear distinction between the two, and between morality and law, such as were
upheld by such enlightenment figures as Cesare Beccaria. Such a clear distinction failed in its
analysis of the phenomena. He was at one with Enlightenment-influenced thought in its
criticism of cruel punishments and advocated a humanitarian approach to the criminal, but he
also emphasised education in Christian morality as the most appropriate means of deterrence.
This divergence from more radical enlightenment views sprang from his lack of confidence in
the capacities of human reason. Nevertheless, a fundamentally humanist philosophy and a
belief in the importance of learning linked his conservatism with an enlightenment belief in
human progress.
r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
In early 19th-century Britain, along with the strong ideologies that had been built
up, especially after the French Revolution to defend the status-quo,1 individual
convictions were likely to draw also on the legacy of the enlightenment. In the
Scottish context, Ned Landsman and others have pointed to the intermingling of
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conservative and enlightenment ideas.2 The Scottish novelist John Galt (1779–1839)
is a good example of this. He was born into a middle class family in Irvine. His father
was involved in ship-building and commerce. Galt tried to establish himself as a
merchant for most of his life and also became a publicist and government agent for
the Upper Canada Company opening up land for settlement. However, his literary
works were perhaps his most successful enterprise.
Galt has been described variously as a conservative and as an enlightenment
figure. The present essay illustrates his unification of early 19th-century intellectual
stances with 18th-century intellectual attitudes. This unification may be seen as part
of the formation and development of the 19th-century conservative mind.3 The
illustration of Galt’s thoughts comes from his little explored notions about law in
particular and human nature in general, as can be found in his rather neglected
articles in magazines and in his novel The Majolo.
As Galt explained in his Autobiography (1833), his thinking about these topics,
was initiated by a discussion on crime, punishment and law reform that had been
stimulated by the enlightenment thinkers Cesare Beccaria and Gaetano Filangieri,
but which had been surely filtered through the events of the period between 1810 and
1830 in Britain. The 18th-century discussions on law reform were mostly concerned
with a humanitarian and secular approach, when new legal codifications were
demanded that would constitute a development in civilisation.4 Punishment, it was
proposed, would correspond to crimes and, severe punishment, such as torture,
would be abolished. Galt also witnessed the pragmatic attempts at law reform
initiated by the British government and politicians like Robert Peel. These reforms
were made, not in response to humanitarian demands, but to a concern for the
preservation of order as crime rates rose.5 Although Galt wrote no single tract on
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penal sanctions as part of the underlying principles of an improved civilisation. On Beccaria’s influence on
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Beccaria,’’ in Essays on Bentham (Oxford, 1982) 40–52.
5See for Robert Peel’s ideas his ‘‘Consolidation of the Criminal Laws,’’ The Speeches of the Later Right
Honourable Sir Robert Peel: Delivered in the House of Commons (London, 1853), ‘‘Mr Peel to Rev. Sydney
Smith, March 24, 1826,’’ in Robert Peel From His Private Papers, ed. Charles S. Parker (London, 1899)
401–402; about law reforms in general and their motivations see Ian Gilmour, Riots, Risings and






























these issues, he frequently inserted some reflection on law and its relationship to
human nature into his writings.6
Galt was a self-professed Tory for whom the status quo was the essence of social
peace and liberty.7 He declared that he was not very political, but always opposed
radical, revolutionary or even reforming politics, and added that he would call
himself ‘‘by the recently assumed term of Conservative.’’8 He was completely
convinced that for any achievable progress, man must accept the wisdom of the past,
but he also advocated the ‘‘practical anticipation of public opinion.’’9 His
conservatism was of a Burkean type that regarded society as a natural, organic
product of slow historical growth, where institutions embodied the lessons learned
by previous generations and developed in response to immediate needs.10 Existing
practices could be perfected by minor reforms, and this in itself assumed the
possibility and desirability of progress that had been summed up in the famous
declaration of Burke:
People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their
ancestors. Besides, the people of England well know that the idea of inheritance
furnishes a sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission,
without at all excluding a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free, but
it secures what it acquires.11
Again, similarly to Burke, Galt held the notion that the origin of civil society and
any progress and tendency to perfection was the consequence of God’s will. Both
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K.O. Morgan, Crime, Protest and Police in Modern British Society: Essays in Memory of David J.V. Jones
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(2 vols.; London, 1833), I, 494–496; Galt, ‘‘The Free Trade Question: Letter I to Oliver Yorke, Esq.,’’
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51 (1957): 455, 468; Suvanto, Conservatism from the French Revolution to the 1990s (London, 1997),
chapter 1; D. Watts, Tories, Conservatives and Unionists 1815–1914 (London, 1994) and Viereck,
Conservatism Revisited: the Revolt Against Revolt 1815–1949 (London, 1950); on the reactionary politics of
this time, see N. O’Sullivan, Conservatism (London, 1976).
8Galt, Autobiography, I, 21, 28 and ibid., II, 7. Nevertheless, he was greatly interested in daily politics as
he reveals in his correspondence: see Galt to Blackwood, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS 4006, ff 219–20v;
Galt to Blackwood, NLS, Blackwood Papers, MSS 4008, ff 172–173v, 192–193v; NLS, Blackwood Papers,
MSS 4010, ff 149–150.
9Galt, Autobiography, I, 28, 95.
10E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J.C.D. Clark (Stanford, 2001) 184, 328, 412.
11Burke, Reflections, 184. Frykman relates Galt to Burke. See E. Frykman, John Galt’s Scottish Stories
(Uppsala, 1959)133, 198. For Galt’s stadialist-gradualist attitude, see Autobiography, I, 94–96 and, ‘‘Free
Trade Question,’’ 593–594.






























dependence on the past and progress were inherent in the natural system created by
God, unalterable by any measure of human legislation.12 This type of conservatism
revealed itself in Galt’s thoughts about crime and punishment where he reached back
to a long established tradition of Christian morality and insisted on a better teaching
of it, rather than advocating something new, such as a penal law separated from any
religious conceptions of sin.
Galt’s interest in law started off, like Adam Smith’s, as a practical need to
understand the legal aspects of mercantile issues, and he was concerned to develop
his skill in this area. He even considered becoming a lawyer at one stage.13 He
explained, ‘‘I made myself master very early of the Lex Mercatoria, not merely by
reading it through, but by studying it as necessary to my progress in the world.’’14
Later on, his readings led him to more abstract issues in the field of law: how and
why it emerged and developed. In 1819, he wrote two columns in The Monthly
Magazine describing his seven principles of political science and the British
Constitution. These columns also presented his perception of the development of
law.15 In common with most enlightenment thinkers he believed that all social
relations were based on the principle of power, and that any social rule was aimed at
order and peace in society and in commercial conduct. As Hume and others had
argued, freedom and security of property could only subsist in a state of
lawfulness.16
The development of law was a demand of societal life. Galt’s ideas on the
formation of society and its functioning were a blend of a simple variation of
contractarian theory and an organic society. According to him, society was
composed of individuals who, when created, had the same rights and powers; and
each individual was endowed with a natural selfishness to accomplish his own will.
People were automatically tempted to maximise their own pleasure and increase their
own power over others. Human beings, left to themselves, would tend to achieve
only their own interests. To avert such a chaos, individuals handed over only the
amount of freedom necessary to a leader or state to ensure protection. The main unit
of society was the family, with its own structure and a patriarchal hierarchy. These
families then formed small communities that chose magistrates to preserve a certain
order. Governments were thus created to limit the ‘‘natural despotisms’’ of
humankind. However, governments also needed some checks so as not to develop
into despotism. To control power and preserve peace, some ‘‘laws have been
invented to regulate the administration of their authority.’’ Thus, laws were
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perceived as a check on inherently selfish human beings and on governments; they
were for readjusting the natural character of individuals to certain rules that would
facilitate the functioning of an organic society.17
Galt’s analysis of laws was similar to that of most of the continental thinkers. He
believed that these laws had firstly a general quality, as Montesquieu, Beccaria and
Filangieri had pointed out. This general quality referred to laws that adhered to
natural law and that were universal and applicable to all societies. Besides this
general or universal nature of laws, there was that which sprang from the
individuality of nations, their cultures and local traditions. These were particular and
circumstantial laws of countries which should be in agreement with universal
principles, as well as with the ‘‘character of a people,’’ their belief and the country’s
climate.18 According to Galt, the diversity of nations made for the relativity of some
laws. Hence, the legislator had to consider that there were diversities among
communities ‘‘in the constitution of their government[s]’’ and in ‘‘customs and
religionytheir climate, their position.’’ In short, Galt believed that diversity in laws
resulted from different cultural backgrounds as well as governmental differences.
In his article, about the British constitution, Galt exemplified a localised approach
to law. The article showed how an institutionalised state constitution attempted to
secure natural rights by paying attention to the specificity of British society. The
British constitution ensured property and individual rights and preserved the existing
hierarchy of society, according to needs imposed by Britain’s climate and local
traditions.19 Furthermore, it was not an entire stable entity, but developed and
changed as expediency demanded; it was an organic entity that adapted itself to
changing conditions. Galt was not against all reforms. Against the accusations of
foreigners of the clumsiness of the constitution, he wrote in his Letters from the
Levant:
They have no idea of the continual effect arising from the nature of that
multifarious tendency to revolution observed in the frame of our government-that
which is continually repairing what is decaying, and supplying by suitable
expedients whatever deficiency is found. The British constitution yadapts itself
to the immediate occasions of the people.20
His explanation of feudal laws expands on this more clearly. Galt held that a
reform-mindedness should be the attitude towards older methods of ordering things.
Rules that had ceased in their efficacy should be changed and adapted to the new
state of the society. Feudal laws in their time had been efficacious and had worked to
good effect. However, they proved to be ‘‘oppressive bondage’’ for succeeding ages.
When the feudal system declined, ‘‘usages and customs under it were deemed
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detrimental to mankind.’’ The fact that it had once been beneficial was not a
sufficient reason to uphold it.21
However, it was also foolish to create a system for which an existing society was
not ready. Each social system had its own way and span of life, eventually
consuming itself. After finishing a stage, society would take on a new form; but it
had to continue to the end at its natural pace. For this reason, if rights were granted
that did not fit with the natural life of that stage of that society, harmony would be
shattered, producing confusion and anarchy, as a natural consequence of an
unnatural development.22
As mentioned above, Galt’s thoughts on social relations rested on contractarian
arguments that had been posited, especially by the Whigs, as the justification for the
need for popular consent during the 18th century.23 Individuals formed a contract
with their rulers, handing over some of their rights for the sake of an orderly and
secure environment. Thus, the sovereigns owed their right of rule to this popular
consent. According to Galt, legal rules functioned mainly in the public sphere to
regulate social interaction, leaving much liberty in private affairs, not concerning
themselves, however, with any moral aspects. Keeping society in order and peace
was the foremost role of the state. Galt thus adhered on matters of the formation of
law and society to the general notions of eighteenth and early 19th-century thinkers,
many of which derived from enlightenment argumentation. He similarly articulated
his belief that national, traditional and climatic differences should be taken into
account in making and evaluating the constitution and legislation of a country. He
observed that the state aimed to secure the greatest possible freedom to individuals
as long as individual actions were not anti-social or criminal in their results.24
Galt’s interest in the questions of penal legislation and crime and punishment, as
he explains in his Autobiography of 1833, was peaked by some articles written in the
Edinburgh Review. In 1805, 1806 and 1807, some translations had been published of
important continental thinkers on this subject: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Beccaria and
Filangieri among others. Galt, who read a review in 1807 of Filangieri’s book, The
Science of Legislation, was particularly struck by his ideas.25 The review made Galt
think about control and deterrence, as well as the moral and religious basis of laws.
Galt was convinced that the contemporary discussions of law reform and
punishment were not being handled with the right conceptions. On the theoretical
level, throughout Europe, discussions about reforms in the penal law were conducted
with humane approaches in mind. The severity of punishment and the use of torture
had been criticised, and the principle of equality before the law was demanded.
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Voltaire, Condillac, Montesquieu, Beccaria and Filangieri were among the well-
known critics of the existing practices of the 18th century. In the 18th and early 19th
century, the individual victim and offender were no longer the focus, but emphasis
was put on the possibility that the rest of society was at risk of becoming a victim or
offender. As a consequence, the discussions about reforms in law revolved around
the question of control for the state’s sake and of deterrence for society’s sake.
Attempts were aimed at making laws more understandable to the people, that is,
making punishment appropriate to the crime. This was important in order to make
punishment effective according to thinkers such as Montesquieu, Beccaria and
Bentham.26 In Britain, such theories, very much influenced by Beccaria’s On Crimes
and Punishment, were expressed either in contractarian, humanitarian terms, as
exemplified in the work of William Eden, or in utilitarian terms, as in Jeremy
Bentham’s works.27
Galt developed his own interpretation of the humane approaches of 18th-century
thinkers in which he attributed more importance to orthodox Christian morality.28
He appeared to be especially against contemporary utilitarian notions of social and
governmental reform. Contemporary Tories opposed Benthamites whom they saw
as unfeeling and over-rational and had rather a vision of an organic, benevolent
society, which would eventually develop into one without crime, ugliness and
neglect.29 According to Galt, firstly these utilitarian theories and their accompanying
social-moral ideals had an anti-Christian connotation; they mistakenly saw
religion as an obstacle to effective reform. For Galt, religious morality and
principles did not entail a departure from humaneness. He saw religion as the
root of humaneness. Secondly, the deterrent system, created in order to establish
peace and security for society and the state, could not work. Importance had
to be given to the rehabilitation of the criminal and the newfangled penitentiaries
were certainly not the way to achieve this.30 Rehabilitation was to be in accordance
with (Christian) morality, which would establish a system of checks within the
individual.
To understand Galt’s emphasis on the connection of morality and crime the
discussions in Europe lead by Beccaria, especially, becomes important. By the 1770s
Beccaria and Filangieri had both become celebrated writers on the subject of the
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29David Roberts, ‘‘Tory Paternalism and Social Reform in Early Victorian England,’’ American
Historical Review 63 (1968): 324.
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reform of the criminal law in Europe. Beccaria, especially, exerted great influence on
many enlightenment thinkers but was, at the same time, heavily criticised by
traditionalist jurists and churchmen.31 Both thinkers, Beccaria and Filangieri,
attempted to make law as logical and reasonable to everyone as possible. They
emphasised prevention rather than punishment. Public awareness of laws was the
key to the prevention of crimes. Punishment was needed as a deterrent system, that
is, as a means of preventing others from committing the same crime. Legal power
was to be used to avoid injury to society rather than to the individual victim.
Punishment was necessary for the welfare of society and for setting an example to
potential criminals. However, as with all of the humanitarian thinkers of the time,
Beccaria and Filangieri were not convinced that torture and overly severe
punishment served the ends of retribution or expiation.32
Beccaria went as far as advocating the abolition of capital punishment.33 He was
convinced that a system with moderate laws would be more didactive to people and
could result in making them more kind and gentle, and less prone to commit crimes.
Human beings tended to avoid pain—characteristically it was the prospect of pain
rather than pleasure that moved man to act—so that they would refrain from
crime.34
The key idea in Beccaria, however, was his resolution to distinguish between crime
and sin and he sought uniformity, irrespective of person, in the application of law.
Similarly to Montesquieu, Beccaria held that religious laws should be of no concern
to secular justice.35 The only possible action against any religious offence could be
the exclusion of the offender from religious services. Thus, according, to this point of
view, the concept of sin became, in general, irrelevant to legal systems. To such
criticisms Beccaria replied:
Some men have thought that the gravity of the sin plays a role in measuring the
degree of criminality of an actiony. The gravity of a sin depends on the
inscrutable malice of the heart, which finite beings cannot know without special
revelation. How, then could it be used as a guide for the punishment of crimes? If
such a thing were tried, men could punish when God pardons and pardon when
God punishes.36
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317–326.
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Franklin,’’ 551–562.
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He explained that legal power was not to be misunderstood as justice or right or
God-given. He said:
We must be careful not to attach any notion of something real to this word
justice, such as a physical force or an actual entity. It is simply a way whereby
humans conceive of things, a way which influences beyond measure the happiness
of all. Nor do I speak here of that justice which flows from God and whose direct
bearing is on the punishments and rewards of the after-life.37
Filangieri, however synthesising the traditional and the new ideas about the nature
of law stressed that laws had to be constructed or reformed in such a way that
people, who would be required to adhere to them, would think of them as enacted
and enforced in accordance with justice conceived as a universal good in itself. The
1807 review of the latest translation of Filangieri’s book, La Scienza della
Legislazione, started, correctly so, by explaining the two natures of law of Filangieri.
Namely, these were universal qualities that referred to absolute goodness; and local
qualities that could be assigned only relative goodness.38 He started with the general
principles of legislation, which related to the preservation of the peace and security
of society. These indeed were, according to Filangieri, the great objects of civil
society. However, against the attempts of many thinkers to divide sin from crime and
the concept of law, Filangieri argued that the absolute goodness of a law consisted in
its conformity to common principles of morality and the precepts of revelation; the
law’s relative goodness, its appropriateness to a specific time and space, should not
contradict these principles and precepts: ‘‘God and nature protect the rights of
mankind, and no transitory expediency can justify their infringement.’’ The
Edinburgh reviewer emphasised Filangieri’s distinctiveness:
He lived as virtuously as he wrote; and his abhorrence of spiritual abuses seems
(which is rare in a continental philosopher) to have stopped short of irreligion.
Hence, perhaps, the zealous friends of revolution spoke of him with coldness.
‘Before we read Filangieri’s book,’ said one of them, with the foolish intolerance
so usual in that school, ‘it will be necessary to determine, whether a lord of the
court, and a nephew of the Archbishop of Naples, is capable of rendering any
service to philosophy.’39
Filangieri observed that laws in individual countries could stand opposed to
common morality and religious virtues and thus ‘‘violate institutions more sacred
than themselves, and resist an authority paramount to that by which they are
prescribed.’’40 So, accordingly, some of the problems arose due to the gap between
human laws and general rules of morality, derived from revealed religion and nature.
He agreed with most enlightenment thinkers that punishment had to be more
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humane, but his concern was more with the difficulties that a legislator confronted in
enacting the laws of relative goodness without violating any principle of absolute
goodness.
Reading about Filangieri’s idea of absolute goodness Galt commented: ‘‘Without
any previous consideration, excepting the work of Beccaria on Crimes and
Punishments, always to me unsatisfactory, I stumbled by a sort of accident on the
enquiries of Filangieri.’’41 Galt agreed with Beccaria that there could not be any
objective justice on earth but he disagreed with Beccaria’s careful distinction between
divine justice and secular penal law.42
Filangieri’s ideas about absolute and relative goodness led Galt to think about the
connection between sin and crime. He agreed with Filangieri that laws did not
always conform to absolute goodness. However, by insisting on relating crime to sin
Galt made, in contrary to the contemporary desires, the definition of both more
complex.
Galt explained that what he liked in Filangieri was that he had constructed
his work ‘‘on the basis of historical precedents’’ and was observant of moral
convictions.43 He argued in his Autobiography that ‘‘[s] ins seemed the basis
of crimes, although there were crimes of a very deep die, of which the original
sins were comparatively not deemed heinous.’’ Although he would have agreed
with the premise that the seriousness of crimes and their underlying sins could
not be equated, he did not want to abandon the link between them. In his
moral interpretations, Galt went further than Filangieri, saying that the
connection between absolute and relative goodness should be emphasised
more.
Filangieri’s connection of universal principles with the Ten Commandments made
an impression on Galt. The Ten Commandments were, according to Filangieri, a
perfect model for the absolute goodness that had to agree with universal principles of
moral conduct with which the particular and circumstantial laws of countries had to
be in agreement.44 Galt thought Filangieri had discovered the right road to truth
about the relationship between sin and crime, but had not been bold enough to
pursue it. ‘‘He seemed afraid of committing himself by stating what he thought of
crimes and sins.’’45
Galt’s universal principle of moral conduct was nothing less than the providential
universal system. He sought a tighter connection between a moral-religious
tradition and the laws. This system was revealed to human beings through scripture.
The universal system might be conceived, Galt explains, as a machine consisting
of many small parts each having an influence on one another. Each part in
this universe was subject to certain ‘‘principles or laws of its own particular
organisation, as well as to those of the universe.’’ All these parts and their
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movements, led ‘‘to the accomplishment of the object for which the whole was
formed’’ by God.46 Now this system created by God and revealed to human beings,
besides being the rules of universal motion, also included the rules of human conduct
that were part of the goal of the whole universe.
This system was not a static entity but encompassed progress. Human nature,
although not to be trusted in origin, was able to change, and government, as well as
the laws of society, evolved in time. As Galt said, ‘‘It is the object and nature of
society to refine itself by science and the arts which reflection and genius suggest for
improvement.’’47 It is clear that he was strongly of the opinion that progress and
development were natural and necessary occurrences. On the other hand, he believed
‘‘mankind was regulated by the character of existing circumstances.’’48 Therefore,
although he stated with deep conviction that there would be a time when the
principles of Christian morality would rule societies, this seemed impossible for the
near future:
Why, the Christian religion is in its nineteenth century, and though there can be
no doubt of the excellence of its morality, mankind are not yet arrived at such a
state of improvement as to be practically ruled by it.49
In order to achieve progress one had to hold on to the laws established by
providence. Galt’s absolute goodness was an extension of providential natural laws.
As mentioned before, all motion in the universe was designed according to a
providential order and aimed at harmony. As every part in the universe acted
according to this divinely established order and to the accomplishment of the
providential objective, so human beings were to adapt to this harmony which would
provide their ultimate peace and happiness. And this whole system, although
impossible to be grasped in toto by human beings, was revealed in scripture to
human minds.50 This, according to Galt, should be the absolute basis of rule and law
in the society and state.
Galt’s ideas on penal law similarly rested on this assumption of the inseparability
of morality and law. Most probably, Galt was drawing here a connection between
these two in terms of an act of the will, and its relation to morality based on
religious injunction. In that sense any criminal act could be perceived as a willful
rebellion against Divine Law. Galt did recognise that there were two elements in a
crime, one worldly and the other to be described in Christian terms. They overlapped
and both had an impact on society. Nevertheless, the penal system punished only the
mundane aspect, whereas the offence against religion would be left to the
providential, natural system: ‘‘I inferred that crimes were proscribed by the laws
of society, but that sins were things against the system of nature, and that legislatures
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never thought of interfering with them, but left their punishments to the re-action of
nature.’’51
Galt’s connection between sin and crime resembled 16th and 17th-century
Presbyterian perceptions.52 Crime and sin were similar entities; sometimes they were
identical or inclusive of each other.53 However, when it came to punishment, on
which the contemporary discussions mainly rested, Galt’s argument was somewhat
weak. Although Galt would agree that punishment was necessary for crime, he was
not convinced that punishment could deter others from committing a similar
offence.54 Against Filangieri’s and Beccaria’s conviction that ‘‘the object of
punishments is simply to prevent the criminal from injuring anew his fellow-citizens,
and to deter others from committing similar injuries,’’55 Galt developed the idea that
punishment was really not useful in the cure of crime, abstracted from the criminal.
In Galt’s opinion it was wrongly assumed that crimes were contagious and that
punishment of a criminal served to deter other vicious minds. He tried to make it
clear with an analogy to diseases. He was convinced that, as one cannot cure a
diseased person by curing another infected patient, likewise it was impossible to cure
crime by a penitentiary system:
In a word, that punishment for example, showed but a shallow knowledge of
human nature, and that it would be just as wise to expect a man could be cured of
the scrofula by punishing another more afflicted with that malady, as to hope that
a criminal could be won from his propensities by showing him another in curing
the penalty of malpractices.56
It is not that Galt did not agree with his contemporaries that reform was needed;
on the contrary, he thought that ‘‘culprits must be reformed, jails should not
continue to be the seminaries of vice.’’ However, an attempt had to be made to check
the first symptoms of criminality.57
Galt concluded that, ‘‘the influence of the doctrine [of punishment as envisaged by
Beccaria] has had a surprising effect, in at once softening pity for the guilty, and
increasing sternness for the infliction of punishment.’’ Thus, this inefficient system
that included imprisonment (‘‘As we confine madmen, we incarcerate delinquents’’),
which had been designed on humanitarian principles, diverged from its main object
and made punishment even more severe.58 According to Galt, Christianity already
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comprehended humanitarian principles: ‘‘Christianityywas neither enlarged nor
bettered by being baptised with the Greek name of philanthropy.’’59 It was to
Christian values that Galt referred when he wrote, ‘‘Humanity is more consulted in
the mitigation of punishment than a wise policy derived from the nature of man.’’60
His rather skeptical approach to the idea of the deterrence of people other than the
actual criminal rested on his distrust of human nature. The nature of man was not to
be trusted too much, since ‘‘Our diseases or offences are manifold.’’ On the one
hand, he was aware of the fact that some punishments were brutal and senseless. On
the other hand, there was the brutal and selfish nature of human beings that had to
be kept in control. Galt disagreed with Beccaria not about the formation of society,
but about the necessity of separating crimes and their punishment from the
principles of religion and morality.
Human beings would refuse to give more of their freedom and be bound by the
burden of a moral law; indeed, a corrupt human nature sought more liberty than
already existed. Humans were incompetent in the matter of dealing with crimes, sins
and punishments because their societies (actually made up of these selfish
individuals) were unwilling to cure these thoroughly. ‘‘Society is not willing to
touch more of them than is requisite for keeping the social community in order; we
are in society, held together by ties more slender than we are willing to believe.’’ The
French Revolution was a good example of this.61
The infected were certainly not to be abandoned.62 Punishment or control over
crime was a complicated issue in need of some correction. However, to try to deter
others from further crime was not the right way of approaching the issue of reform.
It was the offender himself who should be reformed for his own sake. One of the
right ways of approaching this, in Galt’s opinion, was to ensure a proper education
where individuals learned to respect other social beings. Certainly, this education
partly consisted of the development of a religious conscience and morality. Since
Christian morality walked hand in hand with social norms and laws, it was right for
society to impose it on its members. This would set the individual on the right road
because it would teach the individual about the eternal laws and that human beings
existed in a society created and developing according to a divine plan.
The remedy for crime was not punishment but an increased inculcation of
morality in society which would turn the individual away from any evil doing. He
was of the opinion that, just as it was possible to increase one’s ability in aesthetics
by appreciation and the study of art, likewise bad inclinations could be increased by
dexterous usage. Thus, it was important that individuals learn to resist any
temptation that led them to sin and crime. Although he was suspicious about the
nature of human beings, Galt formulated a crucial link between the revival of
Christian morality and an enlightened belief in human progress.
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Although his thought might be read in a purely Christian way, his humanitarian
conclusion and emphasis on education was a significant departure from traditional
Christian conceptions. His disagreement with Beccaria emerged from his belief that
Christian morality was, surely, the best and purest of all possible laws (since it was
part of the perfectly created universe) and for this reason it ought not to be set aside.
He agreed with Filangieri that a deficiency of morality in the nation created an
atmosphere of violence and facilitated crime; the contemporary ideas of punishment
prevented the true and proper analysis of the origins and nature of crime.
Although the better known thinker was Beccaria, and although Filangieri and
Beccaria were often cited together, Galt takes sides with Filangieri who, he thinks,
relates more to morality. He was suspicious of reform and the nature of man, and his
views on law reforms rested both on enlightenment humanitarianism and on his
acceptance of the preordained sinfulness of human nature. He pondered about
questions of the shaping of a social order and law, moving on to think about the
questions of the control of crime and deterrence. In doing this he always referred
back to a detrimental human nature set against a divine law as the source of ultimate
happiness, creating a connection between an enlightenment idea of human progress
and the revival of religious morality.
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